

Press Release

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## GA Counties to Certify Unverifiable Election Results without Audits

ATLANTA GA – Georgia’s June 9<sup>th</sup> primary is riddled with local and national reports of system malfunctions, Election Day voters standing in line for hours, mail in applicants never receiving their ballots and voters confused by late precinct location changes. But **the most serious problem is how the system produced unverifiable, [unadjudicated](#) results that counties will certify without audits.**

Officials claimed they would use public **audits** to compensate for an unverifiable system. However, Georgia counties have confirmed to VoterGA that **no such auditing will take place** for the June 9<sup>th</sup> primary election results. A Morgan County adjudication team found the system [tabulated mail-in ballots incorrectly](#). **Other counties are experiencing similar scanner/tabulator software problems.**

Georgia counties are now set to **certify election results without resolving [adjudication errors](#) and verifying the system counted all mail-votes correctly.** Mail-in votes represent about 40% of the votes cast in the June 9<sup>th</sup> primary.

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In 2019, the Georgia legislature **legalized a new wave of expensive, unverifiable voting** when it passed [HB316](#), a bill sponsored only by members of House Speaker David Ralston’s leadership team. The office of Secretary of State (SOS) Brad Raffensperger then selected a Dominion Ballot Marking Device (BMD) system that **accumulates votes hidden in [encrypted QR codes](#) the voter cannot verify.** The SOS office picked a **product suite [rejected](#) by Texas and a BMD [banned](#) in Colorado** instead of a BMD system that produces full ballots with no bar codes.

**No audits** are ever required for State Senate, State House, judicial, county-wide, non-partisan or municipal elections. Statewide and federal races will ultimately adopt a Risk Limiting Audit (RLA) procedure **that is invalid for auditing BMDs.** RLA inventor, Professor Philip Stark, [wrote](#) to legislators before passage of the bill to warn them his procedures are **meaningless** for BMDs because they cannot audit what BMDs showed to voters and detect malfunctions. BMDs require massive, live, parallel audits, not RLAs that are post-election audit procedures.

Legislators and the SOS controlled [SAFE Commission](#) did not allow [evaluation](#) of Ballot on Demand or Hand Marked Paper Ballot systems that experts say are [more secure](#) and could have [saved](#) taxpayers **\$100 million or more over 10 years.** Instead, they approved a [20 year bond](#) to pay for BMDs with a 10 year shelf life.